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Comment
A ‘PLAUSIBLE’ OUTCOME?: TWOMBLY, IQBAL, AND THE
UNFORESEEN IMPACT ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES
JENNIFER M. AUGER ∗
Between July 1, 2012 and June 30, 2013, there were 284,604 civil
cases filed, 300,485 pending, and 255,260 terminated among the federal
district courts. 1 Out of the civil cases terminated, 171,973 were terminated
before pretrial and 25,816 were terminated during or after pretrial.2 Only
1.2% of the terminated cases actually went to trial and of that fraction, 31%
of those cases were still decided by nonjury means. 3 This data illustrates an
overall trend in the decline of trial rates for civil cases and a prevalence for
adjudication during the early stages of litigation. 4
The rise in pretrial adjudication results in an emphasis on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules”) to administer these cases during
the early stages of litigation. 5 The Supreme Court of the United States
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1. Table 4.1-U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Filed, Terminated, and Pending, Judicial
Facts and Figures 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/41/judicialfacts-and-figures/2013/09/30 (last updated Sept. 30, 2013).
2. Table 4.10-U.S. District Courts-Civil Cases Terminated, by Action Taken, Judicial Facts
and Figures 2013, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/410/judicial-factsand-figures/2013/09/30 (last updated Sept. 30, 2013). Additionally, 54,153 cases resulted in no
court action. Id.
3. Id. Of the 3,129 cases that went to trial, 977 were decided by nonjury means.
4. In 1995, 3.2% of civil cases reached trial; in 2000, 2.2% reached trial; in 2005, 1.4%
reached trial, and in 2011, 1.1% reached trial. Id.
5. See Emery G. Lee, III, Early Stages of Litigation Attorney Survey: Report to the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER 1–2 (Mar. 2012),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/leeearly.pdf/$file/leeearly.pdf (examining the use of
certain Federal Rules during the pretrial stage in terminated cases, specifically FED. R. CIV. P.
26(f) and 16(b)); see also Joe S. Cecil, et. al, Trends in Summary Judgment Practice: A
JUDICIAL
CENTER
1,
3–4
(Nov.
2001),
Preliminary
Analysis,
FEDERAL
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/summjudg.pdf/$file/summjudg.pdf (noting the decrease

905

906

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:905

ultimately prescribes the Federal Rules, 6 however, the Court often interprets
the Rules within the confines of a particular case. 7 As such, the impact of
this judicial interpretation within the greater scheme of the litigation
process may not be fully addressed or envisioned at the time. 8 The effect of
a specific judicial interpretation can have drastic effects on the use of
certain Federal Rules as tools of litigation. 9
In a pair of decisions, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 10 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 11 the Supreme Court purposively amended the standard for complaint
pleading under Federal Rule 8(a), ushering in a new “heightened”
plausibility standard and removing the requirement that courts accept the
truth of conclusory statements.12 While Twombly and Iqbal specifically
addressed the pleading standard for complaints, the impact of these
decisions extends beyond complaints.13 Federal district courts are split as
to whether this “heightened” plausibility standard should also apply to
responsive pleadings, specifically with affirmative defenses.14 While a
majority of the federal district courts extend the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses, 15 a number of federal district courts also expressly
reject the application of the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.16
As the Supreme Court did not address the universality of the Twombly and
in trials for civil cases over the past three decades and one possible cause being the increase in
dispositive motions, specifically motions for summary judgments).
6. “The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77, authorizes the Supreme Court to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for the federal courts.”
Laws
and
Procedures
Governing
the
Rulemaking
Process,
USCOURTS.Gov,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/laws-and-proceduresgoverning-work-rules-committees-0 (last visited Jan. 7, 2016).
7. See generally Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1483, 1552–56 (2013) (discussing the interplay between the Supreme Court and
Advisory Committees, especially the difficulty caused by Supreme Court decisions interpreting
Federal Rules).
8. Richard Vetter, et. al., The Law of Unintended Consequences Revisited: The Case of
Ricci v. DeStefano, CENTER FOR COLLEGE AFFORDABILITY AND PRODUCTIVITY 2 (March 2009),
http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED536275.pdf (“Legislative actions as well as executive and
judicial decisions of governments often have unintended consequences—results not foreseen or
wanted at the time of the initial policy action. On occasion, these unforeseen results clash with the
intent of policies as originally formulated.”).
9. See generally Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended
Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231, 239–40 (2011) (discussing the effect of the
Supreme Court trilogy of decisions on the practice and use of summary judgment: Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
10. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
11. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see infra Part I.B.
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See infra Part I.C.1.
16. See infra Part I.C.2.
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Iqbal decisions, it remains uncertain if the “heightened” plausibility
standard also governs the requirements for affirmative defense pleadings.17
The “heightened” plausibility standard adopted by the Supreme Court
in Twombly and Iqbal had the unintended consequence of “destabilizing”
pleading practices, specifically the pleading standard for affirmative
defenses. 18 This Comment will explore the application of the “heightened”
plausibility standard in relation to the underlying motivations that prompted
the standard, in order to demonstrate that federal district courts should not
extend this standard to affirmative defenses. 19 Specifically, this Comment
will examine the United States District Court for the District of Maryland as
a microcosm to analyze the two views that currently split federal courts. 20
As the Supreme Court only addressed the pleading standard for
complaints in Twombly and Iqbal, district courts should refrain from
applying the heightened plausibility standard to affirmative defenses in
order to maintain a consistent standard while preserving fairness and
efficiency in the litigation process.21 District courts inconsistently apply the
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses; creating an
unstable standard, dependent on the preference within a specific jurisdiction
or even the preference of a specific judge. 22
In addition, affirmative defenses do not raise the same fairness
concerns underlying the Supreme Court’s adoption of the “heightened”
plausibility standard, as the defendant is inherently limited by such a
stringent pleading requirement in advance of discovery. 23 Moreover, the
“heightened” plausibility standard produces ill-fitting results when applied
to affirmative defenses; namely cost and delay resulting from the likely
increased use of motions to strike. 24 The more appropriate avenue for
determining the answer to this question is to follow the Rules Enabling Act
and leave this decision to the Supreme Court.25
I. BACKGROUND
The history of pleading standards in American jurisprudence reveals a
shift in the understanding of the fundamental role of the judicial officer and

17. See infra Part I.C.
18. See generally, Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (Oct. 2010) (arguing that Twombly and
Iqbal destabilized both pleading and motion to dismiss practices).
19. See infra Part II.A.
20. See infra Part I.C.
21. See infra Part II.A.
22. See infra Part II.A.1.
23. See infra Part II.A.2.
24. See infra Part II.A.3.
25. See infra Part II.B.
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court within the litigation process.26 The Federal Rules were adopted in the
spirit of making courts more accessible for the average citizen and pursuing
a decision on the merits of a case.27 The subsequent decision in Conley v.
Gibson 28 reiterated this reasoning by instituting a liberal notice pleading
standard. 29 In contrast, the adoption of the “heightened” plausibility
standard by the Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly30 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal 31 focused mainly on administrative concerns, specifically promoting
efficient case management within the judiciary. 32 The resulting split among
the federal courts regarding the pleading standard for affirmative defenses
illustrates these competing stances. 33
A. Notice Pleading: Opening the Door to Plaintiffs and Looking to the
Merits
The common law precursor and succeeding “code” pleading regime
instituted a rigid, technocratic formula for pleading complaints. 34 The
standard was obscure in practice and theory, drawing ambiguous
distinctions between “ultimate facts” and “conclusions of law.”35 The shift
to notice pleading sought to remove this distinction and introduce a more
flexible standard. 36 This Section will discuss the change to notice pleading
introduced by the Federal Rules and the ensuing decisions by the Supreme
Court affirming this standard.
1. Enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Introduced in 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure replaced the
strict code pleading system with a more reasonable notice pleading
system. 37 The drafters intentionally removed any reference to “facts,”
“conclusions,” or “evidence” in order to distance notice pleading from the
26. See infra Part I.A and I.B.
27. See infra Part I.A.
28. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
29. Id. at 48; see infra Part I.A.
30. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
31. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
32. See infra Part I.B.
33. See infra Part I.C.
34. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 573–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
the English used the hyper-technical Hilary rules of 1834 and the United States relied on the New
York Code of 1848, developed by David Dudley Field).
35. Id. at 574 (“[T]he Field Code and its progeny required a plaintiff to plead ‘facts’ rather
than ‘conclusions,’ a distinction that proved far easier to say than to apply.” (citing Weinstein &
Distler, Comments on Procedural Reform: Drafting Pleading Rules, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 518,
520–21 (1957)).
36. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47–48 (1957) (discussing the intent of the Federal
Rules to adopt a “simplified” standard aimed to get to the merits of the claim).
37. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 573–75 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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prior rigid code pleading regime. 38 Under the Federal Rules, the “idea was
not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in.” 39 The Federal
Rules focused on pleadings to serve “the task of general notice-giving,”
after which “the merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible
pretrial process and, as appropriate, through the crucible of trial.”40
Reflecting this sentiment, under Rule 8(a), a plaintiff need only plead a
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief.” 41 Likewise the standard for responsive pleadings emphasized this
short and plain statement requirement; when pleading an answer, the
defendant must “state in short and plain terms its defenses” and “admit or
deny any allegations asserted against it.” 42 Finally with affirmative
defenses, Rule 8(c) also simply requires a party to affirmatively state any
defense. 43
2. Affirmation of Notice Pleading with Conley’s “No Set of Facts”
Requirement
Following the enactment of the Federal Rules, courts regularly upheld
notice pleading, emphasizing the objective to prevent cursory dismissals of
complaints and reach an outcome on the merits. 44 The most notable
Supreme Court decision, Conley v. Gibson, established the complaint
pleading standard which governed for the next fifty years. 45
The Conley Court endorsed the language of Rule 8(a), reiterating that
the plaintiff is only required to plead a “short and plain statement of the
claim.” 46 As such, the pleading standard for complaints did not “require a
claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim.” 47 The
Court noted this standard served the purpose of providing fair notice to the

38. Id. at 575.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c) provides:
In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or
affirmative defense, including: accord and satisfaction; arbitration and award;
assumption of risk; contributory negligence; duress; estoppel; failure of consideration;
fraud; illegality; injury by fellow servant; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata;
statute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver.”
Id.
44. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in one of the first cases to uphold notice
pleading, noted the prior standard resulted in “judicial haste which in the long run makes waste.”
Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774, 775 (2d Cir. 1944).
45. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (unanimous decision).
46. Id. at 47 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
47. Id. “The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one
misstep by counsel may be decisive to the outcome.” Id. at 48.
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defendant “of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”
without imposing an undue burden on the plaintiff at the initial pleading
stage. 48 Furthermore, the Court stated that a complaint should survive the
initial pleading stage and proceed to discovery to “disclose more precisely
the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the
disputed facts and issues.” 49
The Conley Court then articulated the pleading standard for
complaints: “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”50 The
Supreme Court routinely reaffirmed the Conley standard and twenty-seven
jurisdictions subsequently adopted it as their standard for dismissal of
complaints. 51 As recently as 2002, the Supreme Court again endorsed the
standard in SEC v. Zandford, 52 noting that the court must “assume the
allegations contained therein are true and [dismiss a complaint] only if no
set of facts would entitle petitioner to relief.” 53
B. Twombly and Iqbal: Plausibility as the Gatekeeper to the Federal
Courts
Beginning with Twombly and culminating in Iqbal, the Supreme Court
departed from the standard espoused in Conley and introduced plausibility
as the standard for pleading complaints. Twombly and Iqbal not only
represent a change in the complaint pleading standard, but also a shift in the
understanding of the role of pleading and access to courts. 54 The
underlying concern of the Court in both Twombly and Iqbal centered on
administrative functions, namely upholding an efficient and meritorious
admission process to the federal courts.55

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 45–46.
51. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 577 n.4 (2007) (Stevens. J.,
dissenting) (listing sixteen Supreme Court decisions citing to Conley as authority); see also id. at
578 n.5 (identifying twenty-six States and the District of Columbia adopting the Conley standard
as their standard for dismissal of complaints).
52. 535 U.S. 813 (2002).
53. Id. at 818 (quoting Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 811 (1993) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). The Supreme Court overturned the prior decision by
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit because the court applied the wrong standard when
determining whether to dismiss a complaint. Id.
54. See infra Part I.B.1.b.
55. See infra Part I.B.1.b.
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1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: A Move to Plausibility
The Twombly Court repudiated notice pleading, stating that conclusory
statements and the “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action” were insufficient.56
a. Application of the Conley Standard
The plaintiffs in Twombly alleged a violation of Section One of the
Sherman Act 57 against certain Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers
(“ILECs”). 58 The complaint alleged that the companies “conspired to
restrain trade” with local telephone and high-speed internet services by
“engag[ing] in parallel conduct” and entering into agreements to “refrain
from competing against one another.” 59 The United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York initially dismissed the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 60 The district
court concluded that to meet a conspiracy claim under the Sherman Act, the
plaintiffs “must allege additional facts that ‘ten[d] to exclude independent
self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ parallel
behavior.’” 61 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, finding
the district court should have examined the complaint under Conley and
dismissed the complaint only if “there is no set of facts that would permit a
plaintiff to demonstrate that the particular parallelism asserted was the
product of collusion rather than coincidence.”62
b. Development of the Plausibility Standard
The Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs did not provide any
factual allegations demonstrating evidence of anything more than
independent, parallel conduct and as such, the complaint did not sufficiently
56. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
57. Id. at 550 (“[W]hich prohibits [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations.” (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1)).
58. Id. at 549–50.
59. Id. at 551. The complaint stated that the ILECS “allegedly control ninety percent or more
of the market for local telephone service in the forty-eight contiguous States,” id. at 550 n.1, and
alleged that the ILECs “engaged in parallel conduct . . . to inhibit the growth of upstart CLECs
[Competitive Local Exchange Carriers]” by making unfair agreements with the CLECs that
provided “inferior connections to the networks, overcharging, and billing in ways designed to
sabotage the CLEC’s relations with their own customers.” Id. at 550.
60. Id. at 552. The District Court stated that “plaintiffs may allege a conspiracy by citing
instances of parallel business behavior that suggest an agreement” but “this circumstantial
evidence . . . [of] ‘conscious parallelism’ has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman Act
entirely.” Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
61. Twombly, 313 F. Supp. 2d at 179.
62. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 553 (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,
425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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allege conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act and was dismissed. 63
Discussing the standard that should apply to complaints, the Twombly Court
expressed that “bare assertions” or “mere[] legal conclusions” could not
suffice for factual allegations because something more was needed to
demonstrate not just that the plaintiffs’ allegations were probable, but
plausible. 64 As such, the Court developed the plausibility standard, which
requires a plaintiff to plead enough facts to “state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” 65 The Court further argued that the plausibility
standard better reflects the showing requirement for complaints articulated
in Rule 8(a)(2) which requires that “the ‘plain statement’ possess enough
heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”66
The Twombly Court emphasized several administrative purposes
prompting the adoption of the plausibility standard, namely discouraging
frivolous lawsuits, preventing discovery abuse, and effectively managing
caseloads. 67 The Court reasoned that this “heightened” plausibility standard
better prevented frivolous lawsuits by exposing the deficiency of a
complaint at the “point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the
parties and by the court.” 68 In addition, the Court worried that these
baseless claims proceeding past the complaint stage would constitute a
threat of litigation prompting defendants to reach settlements in order to
avoid the cost of litigation. 69 This potential for discovery abuse required
the Court to “insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a
potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.”70 The Twombly Court
also questioned the capability of a judge to truly weed out frivolous cases
via case management. 71 Since the parties develop the legal claims and
63. Id. at 566. The conduct of the ILECs could be “consistent with conspiracy, but just as
much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy.” Id. at 554.
64. Id. at 555—57.
65. Id. at 570. The Court further clarified that it did not require “heightened fact pleading of
specifics,” but just enough facts to demonstrate that a complaint is plausible on its face. Id.
66. Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 558 (quoting 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1216 at 233–34 (3d. ed. 2004)). This deficiency includes not only
complaints which do not allege enough factual matter to determine if entitlement to relief is
plausible, but also complaints whose factual allegations, although true, could not “raise a claim to
entitlement of relief.” Id.
69. Id. at 557–58. Particularly in the context of antitrust cases, like that in Twombly, the
Court worried that these baseless claims would be allowed “to take up the time of a number of
other people, with the right to do so representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement
value.” Id. at 558 (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
70. Id. at 558 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528 n.17 (1983)). An additional concern regarding discovery abuse ties
into the issue of case management, that the “success of judicial supervision in checking discovery
abuse has been on the modest side.” Id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse,
69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638 (1989)).
71. Id. at 559.
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conduct discovery themselves, the judge is often not aware of all of the
details of the case that will be presented. 72 This leaves the judge unable to
“prevent what [he] cannot detect,” and thus unable to prevent abusive
discovery because he lacks the “essential information” of the case. 73
The Court finally retired Conley’s “no set of facts” language, stating
that the phrase is “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an
accepted pleading standard.” 74 The Twombly Court further suggested that
the “literal terms” of Conley were never accepted nor intended as a
complaint pleading standard. 75 The Court concluded that Conley described
the “breadth of opportunity to prove what an adequate complaint claims,
not the minimum standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s
survival.” 76
c. Concern Regarding the Adoption of the Plausibility Standard
Justice Stevens authored a strong dissent, in which he expressed
concern with the departure from existing precedent and possible
consequences emanating from the shift to the plausibility standard. 77 He
addressed the break from precedent, noting the majority’s sudden retirement
of Conley as the “dramatic departure from settled procedural law.”78
Justice Stevens also called into question the majority’s account of Conley as
“puzz[ling] the profession for [fifty] years.” 79 He noted that Conley is cited
as authority in a dozen Supreme Court decisions 80 and deemed this “opinion
[as] the first by any Member of this Court to express any doubt as to the
adequacy of the Conley formulation.” 81
Next, Justice Stevens argued that Conley must be read in light of the
Federal Rules and the subsequent evolution from code pleading to notice

72. Id. “The judicial officer always knows less than the parties, and the parties themselves
may not know very well where they are going or what they expect to find.” Id. at 560 n.6 (quoting
Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39 (1989)).
73. Id. at 560.
74. Id. at 563.
75. See id. at 562 (noting many judges and commentators “balked” at the literal interpretation
of Conley as a pleading standard).
76. Id. at 563. The Court also argued that this reading of Conley is more in line with prior
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at n.8.
77. Id. at 570–97 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 573. Justice Stevens also noted that “[p]etitioners have not requested that the
Conley formulation be retired, nor have any of the six amici who filed briefs in support of the
petitioners.” Id. at 579.
79. Id. at 577 (quoting id. at 563 (majority opinion)).
80. Id. at 577 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (listing sixteen Supreme Court opinions and four
separate writings that cited to Conley as authority).
81. Id. at 578.
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pleading. 82 “Conley’s language, in short, captures the policy choice
embodied in the Federal Rules and binding on the federal courts.”83 Justice
Stevens suggests that the Conley standard already accomplishes precisely
what the Court attempts to do with plausibility; it describes “the minimum
standard of adequate pleading to govern a complaint’s survival.”84
Resolute in defending the Conley standard, Justice Stevens declared
“[i]f Conley’s ‘no set of facts’ language is to be interred, let it not be
without a eulogy.” 85 He emphasized that a large number of jurisdictions,
twenty-six states, and the District of Columbia adopted the language of
Conley as their standard for dismissal of a complaint. 86 Inherent in Justice
Stevens’s dissent is the concern regarding the implications of this sudden
shift in pleading standards. In light of the extensive and long-standing
precedent with Conley, Justice Stevens lamented that “[he] would not
rewrite the Nation’s civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the
pleading rules of most of its States without far more informed deliberation
as to the costs of doing so.” 87
The Twombly decision marked the beginning of a departure from the
established notice pleading regime and Conley standard. The Twombly
Court focused on ensuring that only meritorious claims would make it to
the courtroom through effective case management, and thus adopted a new
standard of plausibility for complaints.88 As a result, plaintiffs must now
plead enough factual allegations within the complaint to “state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face.” 89
2. Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Clarification and Expansion of Plausibility
Two years later, in Iqbal, the Supreme Court affirmed the plausibility
standard for pleading complaints established in Twombly and further
clarified the standard by articulating a two-prong method of analysis. 90
a. A Request for Clarification
The plaintiff in Iqbal faced charges of fraud in relation to his
identification documents and was under investigation as a person of “high
82. Id. at 573–83. “[A]s the Conley Court well knew, the pleading standard the Federal
Rules meant to codify does not require, or even invite, the pleading of facts.” Id. at 580.
83. Id. at 583.
84. Id. at 580 (quoting id. at 563 (majority opinion)).
85. Id. at 577.
86. Id. at 578 n.5 (listing the twenty-six state opinions that adopted the Conley standard for
dismissal of a complaint).
87. Id. at 579. Justice Stevens further notes that there is an existing process to make these
sorts of revisions through Congress and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–74. Id.
88. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
90. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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interest” in relation to the September 11, 2001 attacks. 91 The plaintiff
claimed that while he was being investigated he was subject to harsh
conditions of confinement, based solely on account of his “religion, race, or
national origin.” 92 The plaintiff brought claims against a number of
government officials for alleged deprivations of constitutional protections
while in federal custody. 93
In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to
state sufficient allegations demonstrating their personal involvement in the
treatment of the plaintiff in order to defeat a defense of qualified
immunity. 94 The district court denied the motion, and, relying on Conley,
found the plaintiffs “alleged sufficient facts to warrant discovery as to the
defendants involvement.” 95 The defendants then filed an interlocutory
appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.96 The
Supreme Court decided Twombly while this appeal was pending, thus the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first considered how to apply the
Twombly plausibility standard.97 The court of appeals concluded that
Twombly set out a “flexible plausibility standard” and only required a
pleader to “amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts
where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.” 98
The court of appeals found that the “context” of the appeal in this case
did not require amplification and thus held that the plaintiff’s complaint
adequately alleged the defendants personal involvement.99 However, the
court of appeals urged the Supreme Court to “address the appropriate
pleading standard ‘at the earliest opportunity.’”100 The Supreme Court

91. Id. at 667.
92. Id at 668–69. The plaintiff’s claims included being physically accosted by federal
corrections officers who prevented him from practicing his religion, by refusing to let him pray.
Id. at 668.
93. Id. at 668. The plaintiff “filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York against thirty-four current and former federal officials and nineteen
‘John Doe’ federal corrections officers.” Id. The plaintiff further named the former Attorney
General of the United States, John Ashcroft, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigations, Robert Mueller, in the complaint and alleged they “knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” plaintiff to the harsh conditions during his detention.
Id.
94. Id. at 669 (quoting Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-1809, 2005 LEXIS 21434, *51–
52 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2005)).
95. Elmaghraby, 2005 LEXIS 21434, at *68. The Court also noted the “[p]laintiffs should
not be penalized for failing to assert more facts where, as here, the extent of defendants’
involvement is peculiarly within their knowledge.” Id.
96. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 669.
97. Id. at 669–70.
98. Id. at 670 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157–58 (2d Cir. 2007)).
99. Id. (quoting Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 174).
100. Id. (citing Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 178 (Cabranes, J., concurring)).
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granted certiorari to clarify the plausibility standard articulated in
Twombly. 101
b. Further Articulation of the Plausibility Standard
The Court first clarified the Twombly standard by providing a clearer
understanding of the meaning of “plausibility.” For a claim to have facial
plausibility, the plaintiff must plead “factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” 102 A complaint must plead facts that are more than “‘merely
consistent with’ a defendant’s liability” in order to cross the line from
probability to plausibility that the “defendant has acted unlawfully.” 103
Finally, the Court further confirmed that the decision in Twombly
“expounded the [complaint] pleading standard for ‘all civil actions.’”104
With that, the Iqbal Court put the final nail in the coffin for Conley’s “no
set of facts” standard.
Next, the Court provided a two-prong approach to determine the
sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard.105 First, a court
must distinguish between well-pleaded factual allegations and legal
conclusions. 106 As only factual allegations are entitled to the “presumption
of truth,” “legal conclusions can provide the framework of the complaint,
[but] they must be supported by factual allegations.” 107 Second, a court
must determine whether the factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an
entitlement of relief.” 108 The Court clarified that this is a “context-specific
task,” which requires “the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense” to determine if the complaint rises to this level.109
Akin to the reasoning articulated by the Twombly Court, the Court in
Iqbal relied on the Federal Rules and case management concerns to support
101. Id.
102. Id. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). In this
case, the Court found that the complaint did not “contain any factual allegation sufficient to
plausibly suggest [defendants’] discriminatory state of mind.” Id. at 684.
103. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, the Court determined the complaint’s
“only factual allegation against [defendants Ashcroft and Mueller] accuses them of adopting a
policy approving ‘restrictive conditions of confinement’ for post-September-11 detainees until
they were cleared by the FBI.” Id. at 683. The complaint did not provide factual content to
“nudge his claim of purposeful discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Id.
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
104. Id. at 684. The Court made clear that the plausibility standard was not limited solely to
claims of antitrust or discrimination suits like those seen in Twombly and Iqbal. Id.
105. The Court provided this analysis in the context of what is necessary for a complaint to
survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 678–79.
106. Id. at 679 (citing Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d. 143, 157–78 (2d Cir. 2007)).
107. Id. at 679. The Court further stated that courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
108. Id. at 679.
109. Id. at 678–79.
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the plausibility standard. 110 The Court confirmed that the Twombly decision
was “based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8,” which requires
a showing that the pleader was entitled to relief.111 Again, the Court
rejected the “careful-case-management approach,” arguing that a “motion to
dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls
placed upon the discovery process.” 112 Further supporting concerns of
effective case management, the Court again noted the limited role and
success of judicial supervision in averting discovery abuse.113
c. Apprehension Regarding the Practical Application of the
Plausibility Standard
Justice Souter authored a dissent in which he argued the majority
misapplied the Twombly pleading standard. 114 Justice Souter contended
that Twombly does not require a court to consider whether the allegations in
the complaint are probably true, but rather “that a court must take the
allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be.” 115 He
articulated that “[t]he sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are
sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green
men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel.”116
Justice Breyer joined in Justice Souter’s dissent, but wrote separately
to voice his concern over the emphasis the majority placed on preventing
“unwarranted litigation” from interfering with the work of the
Government. 117 He noted that trial courts have “other legal weapons
designed to prevent unwarranted interference.”118 Justice Breyer concluded
that he is not convinced by the majority opinion that these “alternative case-

110. Id. at 684–87.
111. Id. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical,
code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).
112. Id. at 684–85. The plaintiff argued that the court of appeals instructed the district court to
conduct minimally invasive discovery in order to “preserve the [defendant’s] defense of qualified
immunity” while determining the defendant’s personal involvement in the treatment of the
plaintiff. Id. at 684.
113. Id. at 685 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007)).
114. Id. at 687–99 (Souter, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 696. Justice Souter ultimately determined “there is no principled basis for the
majority’s disregard of the allegations linking [defendants] Ashcroft and Mueller to their
subordinates’ discrimination.” Id. at 698.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer found the majority incorrectly
interpreted Twombly and Federal Rule 8 to prevent unwarranted litigation in the context of this
case, with government officials. Id. at 699–700.
118. Id. at 700. Specifically, the trial court can “structure discovery in ways that diminish the
risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials.” Id.
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management tools [are] inadequate, either in general or in the case before
us.” 119
C. The Unknown Extent of the Plausibility Standard in the Universe of
Pleadings
In the wake of Twombly and Iqbal, federal courts regularly apply the
plausibility standard to complaints.120
Courts have not, however,
consistently applied the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.121
Neither the Supreme Court nor any court of appeals has yet to address this
issue. 122 Presently, there is no consensus on the issue among the lower
courts; a split exists within some circuits 123 and even within individual
district courts. 124 The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland (“U.S. District Court for Maryland”) demonstrates this split, with
the inconsistent application of the “heightened” plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses. 125 Part I.C.1 discusses what is considered the
“majority approach” within the U.S. District Court for Maryland, which
applies the standard to affirmative defenses.126 Part I.C.2 discusses the
“minority approach,” which declines to extend the standard to affirmative
defenses. 127
1.

The Majority Stance: The Plausibility Standard Applies to
Affirmative Defenses

The majority approach within the U.S. District Court for Maryland
applies the reasoning of Twombly and Iqbal to require the heightened
standard for affirmative defense pleadings.128 First, the majority argues that
119. Id.
120. Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 535 (D. Md. 2010); LBCMT
2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D. Md. 2014); Hansen v. Rhode
Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D. 119, 121 (D. Mass. 2012); HCRI
TRS Acquirer, LLC v. Iwer, 708 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (N.D. Ohio 2010).
121. See infra notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
122. Hansen, 287 F.R.D. at 122; EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala.
2012); LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387.
123. Compare Racick v. Dominion Law Assocs., 270 F.R.D. 228, 234 (E.D.N.C. 2010)
(applying Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses), with Lockheed Martin Corp. v United
States, 973 F. Supp. 2d, 591, 595 (D. Md. 2013) (declining to apply Twombly and Iqbal to
affirmative defenses).
124. Compare Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 533 (finding Twombly and Iqbal apply to
affirmative defenses), with Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 595 (holding Twombly and
Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defense pleadings); LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC, 302
F.R.D. at 387 (finding Twombly and Iqbal do not apply to affirmative defenses).
125. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
126. See infra Part I.C.1.
127. See infra Part I.C.2.
128. Hammer v. Peninsula Poultry Equip. Co., Civil Action No. 12-1139, 2013 WL 97398 (D.
Md. Jan. 8, 2013); Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 532; Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc.,
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the plausibility standard better addresses administrative concerns, most
notably efficient case management. 129 Second, in the context of affirmative
defenses, the plausibility standard better ensures fairness in the litigation
process. 130 Third, in light of Rule 8, the plausibility standard should extend
to all pleadings in order to provide a consistent standard. 131
Courts adopting this approach argue that extending the “heightened”
plausibility standard promotes litigation efficiency by discouraging the
assertion of boilerplate affirmative defenses.132
Furthermore, that
prevention of boilerplate affirmative defenses will minimize discovery
abuse. 133 In Aguilar v. City Lights of China Restaurant 134 the defendant
pleaded five affirmative defenses 135 in response to the complaint, without
any articulation of the factual basis for the defenses. 136 The court struck
four of the defenses, noting specifically that the majority of the defenses set
“forth conclusory legal statements wholly devoid of any supporting factual
content.” 137 The court noted that the effect of these boilerplate defenses is
to “clutter the docket and . . . create unnecessary work,” which then results
in opposing counsel conducting “unnecessary discovery.” 138 Requiring
some statement of the ultimate facts underlying the defense promotes
litigation efficiency, while preventing the “unnecessary discovery that
troubled the Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.” 139
Tied with this concern of boilerplate assertions is the interest of
fairness to the plaintiff. Notably, one of the fundamental purposes of

Civil Action No. 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011); Ulyssix Techs. Inc. v
Orbital Network Eng’g, Inc., Civil No. 10-02091, 2011 WL 631145 (D. Md. Feb. 11, 2011); Barry
v. EMC Mortgage, Civil No. 10-3120, 2011 WL 4352104 (D. Md. Sep. 15, 2011); Blind Indus.
and Serv. of Md. v. Route 40 Paintball Park, Civil No. 11-3562, 2012 WL 2946688 (D. Md. July
17, 2012); Alston v. Equifax Info. Serv., LLC, Civil No. 13-934, 2014 WL 580148 (D. Md. Feb.
11, 2014); Topline Sol., Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., Civil No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836 (D.
Md. July 27, 2010).
129. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.
131. See infra text accompanying note 145.
132. Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536 (“The application of the Twombly and Iqbal standard
to defenses will also promote litigation efficiency and will discourage defendants from asserting
boilerplate affirmative defenses.”).
133. Id. (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. O’Hara Corp., No. 08-CV-10545, 2008 WL
2558015, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 25, 2008).
134. Civil Action No. 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011) (Chasanow, J.).
135. Including (1) accord and satisfaction; (2) estoppel, (3) laches, (4) payment/offset, and (5)
fraud. Id. at *1.
136. Answer at 3, Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., No. 8:11-CV-02416 (D. Md.
Sept. 22, 2011).
137. Aguilar, 2011 WL 5118325 at *4. The Court struck the fraud defense because it failed to
satisfy the pleading standard set forth under Rule 9(b). Id. at *4.
138. Id. at *2 (alteration in original) (quoting Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536).
139. Id. at *4.
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pleading is to provide notice. 140 As such, applying the plausibility standard
to affirmative defenses provides the opposing party with notice of the
factual basis for the assertion. 141 Furthermore, disclosing the factual basis
at this juncture provides “proper notice of defenses in advance of the
discovery process and trial.” 142 This approach suggests that the plausibility
standard better promotes the interests of fairness and consistency by
allowing the plaintiff to shape litigation strategy and discovery within the
framework of this defense. 143 Additionally, courts adopting this approach
argue that the interest of fairness is not achieved when different standards
result in different requirements for each party, specifically, where the
plaintiff is required to operate under one standard, while the defendant is
permitted to “operate under a different, less stringent standard.”144
The majority further supports the extension of the plausibility standard
to the entirety of Rule 8, noting that “although Twombly and Iqbal
specifically addressed the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 8(a), the
[Supreme] Court likely did not intend to confine its holdings to complaints
alone.” 145 In Barry v. EMC Mortgage, 146 the court noted that while the
language of Rule 8(a) and 8(b) are not identical, there is “important textual
overlap, with both subsections requiring a ‘short and plain statement’ of the
claim or defense.” 147 The Barry court found that five of the defendant’s
affirmative defenses failed to meet these requirements because “[e]ach of
those defenses set forth conclusory legal statements wholly devoid of any
factual content to support them.” 148 The court concluded the defenses did
not “set forth in ‘short and plain’ terms the nature of the asserted defense
and [thus] violate[d] Rule 8’s general pleading requirements.” 149 Based on
the similar language within the subsections of Rule 8 and interpretation of
pleading practices under this Rule in Twombly and Iqbal, the majority
contends the plausibility standard should extend to all of Rule 8, including
affirmative defenses.

140. See supra Part I.A.
141. Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
142. Id. The Court also noted that “the extension of these pleading requirements will not
unduly hamstring a party’s ability to mount a thorough and vigorous defense.” Id.
143. Id.
144. Topline Sol., Inc. v. Sandler Sys., Inc., Civil No. L-09-3102, 2010 WL 2998836, at *1 (D.
Md. July 27, 2010).
145. Aguilar v. City Lights of China Rest., Inc., Civil No. 11-2416, 2011 WL 5118325, at *4
(D. Md. Oct. 24, 2011).
146. Civil No. 10-3120, 2011 WL 4352104 (D. Md. Sep. 15, 2011) (Chasanow, J.).
147. Barry, 2011 WL 4352104 at *3.
148. Id. at *5. The affirmative defenses included (1) good faith compliance, (2) estoppel, (3)
release, (4) statute of frauds, and (5) waiver. Id. at *4–5.
149. Id. at *5.
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The Minority Stance: Declining to Extend the Plausibility
Standard to Affirmative Defenses

An outspoken minority within the U.S. District Court for Maryland
have declined to extend the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses.150
Their approach notes a principal concern with overextending the Twombly
and Iqbal decisions and thus overstepping the Supreme Court. 151
Furthermore, the minority approach argues the concerns articulated in
Twombly and Iqbal, regarding effective case management and fairness to
the parties, do not apply in the realm of affirmative defenses. 152 Finally, the
minority relies on the plain language of Rule 8 to further demonstrate that
complaints and affirmative defenses should not be held to the same
standard. 153
The minority approach emphasizes the concern that Twombly and
Iqbal only address the pleading standard for complaints under Rule
8(a)(2). 154 As such, extending the plausibility standard to the rest of the
subsections of Rule 8 and all pleadings goes beyond the holdings of these
decisions. 155 In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 156 the court argued
it was “unlikely that the Supreme Court ‘would have ushered in such a
radical change in legal landscape sub silentio.’” 157 Thus, the lack of any
discussion of affirmative defenses within Twombly or Iqbal led the
Lockheed court to determine that the Supreme Court did not intend, nor
consider, whether the “heightened” plausibility standard applied to
affirmative defenses. 158
Additionally, the minority approach argues the policy concerns
articulated in Twombly and Iqbal are not furthered by the application of the
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. The differences
between the functions of an initiatory pleading, such as complaints, and a
responsive pleading, such as affirmative defenses, implicate distinctive
150. It is interesting to note that while there are fewer decisions by the U.S. District Court for
Maryland declining to apply Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses, these decisions are more
recent and contain a greater number of published decisions. Compare Lockheed Martin Corp. v.
United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 951 (D. Md. 2013); LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v.
Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385 (D. Md. 2014) (declining to extend Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative
defenses), with cases cited supra note 128 (concluding Twombly and Iqbal do apply to pleading
affirmative defenses).
151. See infra text accompanying notes 154–155.
152. See infra text accompanying note 159.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 169–175.
154. See text accompanying supra note 66.
155. Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
156. 973 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md. 2013) (Williams, Jr., J.).
157. Id. at 594 (quoting Rosa v. Bd. of Educ. of Charles Cty, Md., Civil Action No. 8:11-cv02873, 2012 WL 3715331, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 27, 2012)). Sub silentio meaning “under silence;
without expressly being mentioned.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1656 (10th ed. 2014).
158. Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
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approaches when addressing these policy concerns. 159
First, with
affirmative defenses, the minority approach argues the concerns regarding
effective case management and preventing frivolous litigation are better
dealt with through discovery and existing procedural safeguards. 160 The
court addressed this incompatibility in Lockheed Martin Corp., suggesting
that discovery is the more appropriate venue for case management concerns
with affirmative defenses.161 The Lockheed Court noted that “while the
presence of boilerplate affirmative defenses could make more material
relevant to a party’s claim or defense, courts presumably could consider a
defense’s conclusory nature when ruling on the discovery request.” 162 The
Court further concluded “judicial economy and equity depend on screening
complaints more than they do on screening affirmative defenses.” 163
Moreover, this approach notes the existence of safeguards like Rule 11, 164
which discourages the pleading of boilerplate affirmative defenses since
defendants “are still held to a basic standard of accountability for the
contents of their court papers.” 165
Second, courts argue that the concerns regarding fairness for the
plaintiff in the majority approach preclude any consideration of the interests
of fairness to the defendant. Federal Rule 12 provides a twenty-one day
window of time in which the defendant must answer the complaint. 166 This
shorter window of time puts defendants at a disadvantage to “determine and
plead affirmative defenses” in contrast to the longer amount of time that
plaintiffs have “to develop the facts that should be pled to support their
complaint.” 167
The minority approach suggests that applying the
plausibility standard and requiring a defendant to assert factual allegations

159. Id. at 595 (“[A]ffirmative defenses do not invoke the jurisdiction of the court and, at least
technically, do not expose plaintiffs to liability.”).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 594–95.
162. Id. at 595.
163. Id. at 595 (citing Tiscareno v. Frasier, No. 2-07-CV-336, 2012 WL 1377886, at *15 (D.
Utah Apr. 19, 2012)).
164. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 governs representations made to the court and requires that: “the
claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). The rule also requires that “the factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3).
165. LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 388 (D. Md. 2014).
166. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).
167. Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594 (quoting Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple
Cell, Inc., No. 13-617, 2013 WL 3776933, at *9 n.6 (D. Md. Apr. 19, 2012)). “Rule 8(a)’s more
demanding principle is better applied to claimants who have had significant time to craft their
claims.” LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387.
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to support the stated defense “unfairly places on them too substantial a
burden too early in the litigation process.”168
Finally, courts argue the textual differences between the provisions of
Rule 8 cannot support the application of one standard to all the
provisions. 169 The Court in LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike v. Sheppard 170
stated “it is reasonable to interpret the wording of Rule 8(b) and (c) . . .
differently from the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the
distinctive wording of Rule 8(a) applicable to claims for relief.”171 Rule
8(a)(2) requires a “short and plain statement showing the plaintiff is entitled
to relief.” 172 While Rule 8(b) requires a party to “state in short and plain
terms its defenses” and “admit or deny the allegations.” 173 Similarly, under
Rule 8(c)(1) when pleading an affirmative defense, a party is only required
to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”174 The court
in Lockheed Martin Corp. declared “[i]t would be anomalous if Rule 8(b)
allowed parties to generally deny the allegations in the complaint yet [under
Rule 8(c)(1)] required them to plead facially plausible affirmative
defenses.” 175 This approach relies on the differences in the language
between pleading standards for complaints and defenses to illustrate the
incompatibility between the “heightened” plausibility standard and
affirmative defenses.176
II. ANALYSIS
As economist Frédéric Bastiat once noted, there is a crucial distinction
between effects that are “seen” and those that are “unseen:”
Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself
simultaneously with its cause—it is seen. The others unfold in
succession—they are not seen: it is well for us if they are
foreseen . . . this constitutes the whole difference—the one takes
account of the visible effect; the other takes account both of the

168. LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387.
169. Id.
170. 302 F.R.D. 385 (D. Md. 2014) (Bredar, J.).
171. Id. at 387.
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). As noted by the Court in Twombly, “showing”
is the key term, indicating that the plaintiff must provide factual allegations demonstrating that the
pleader is entitled to relief. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–57 (2007).
173. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1). The Lockheed court also noted that although FED. R. CIV. P.
8(b)(3) does not mention affirmative defenses, a party is allowed to generally deny all the
allegations of a pleading. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (D.
Md. 2013).
174. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
175. Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
176. Id.; LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, 302 F.R.D. at 387.
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effects which are seen and also of those which it is necessary to
foresee. 177
As Justice Stevens recognized, the adoption of the plausibility standard
lacked examination of the unseen and thus “call[ed] into doubt the pleading
rules . . . without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing
so.” 178 The cost in this case is the destabilization of pleading practices as
demonstrated by the divide amongst the lower courts over the appropriate
standard for affirmative defenses. 179
In application, extending the “heightened” plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses does not achieve the objectives articulated by the Court
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 180 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 181 This
extension to affirmative defenses resulted in a number of unintended
consequences within pleading practices in the federal courts. First, there is
a state of confusion regarding the governing standard causing uncertainty
for defendants when pleading an affirmative defense. 182 Second, it hinders
fairness in the litigation process by blocking defendants’ access to
discovery in order to completely develop the factual basis for these
defenses. 183 Third, the heightened plausibility standard arguably causes an
increase in wasteful pleading practices by engendering the use of
“retaliatory” motions to strike. 184
Furthermore, the decision to extend the “heightened” plausibility
standard to affirmative defenses violates the Rules Enabling Act.185 The
federal district courts should refrain from extending the “heightened
plausibility” standard without clarification from the Supreme Court. 186 As
the Supreme Court and Rules Committees can provide clear guidance for all
federal courts, the decision is better left to that venue. 187

177. M. FREDERIC BASTIAT, That Which Is Seen and That Which Is Not Seen, reprinted in
ESSAYS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY 49, 49 (New York, G.P. Putnam & Sons 3d ed., 1874).
178. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 579 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See supra Part I.C.
180. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
181. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
182. See infra Part II.A.1.
183. See infra Part II.A.2.
184. See infra Part II.A.3.
185. See infra Part II.B.
186. See infra Part II.B.
187. See infra Part II.B.

2016]

THE UNFORSEEN IMPACT ON AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

925

A. The Application of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative Defenses: An
Ill-Fitting Result
1.

The Lack of a Consistent Standard Results in an Unclear
Expectation for Defendants

The standard for pleading affirmative defenses varies, both by
jurisdiction and even by judicial preference, making it difficult for
defendants to knowledgably plead affirmative defenses. Furthering this
confusion and uncertainty is the noted fluctuation in which approach is
predominantly endorsed by courts.188 In the immediate aftermath of
Twombly and Iqbal, the majority of federal courts that addressed this issue
decided in favor of the application of the plausibility standard to affirmative
defenses. 189 However, a number of courts 190 and scholars 191 recently noted
a shift in the trend of which approach is favored. For instance, in the U.S.
District Court for Maryland, early decisions adopted the majority approach
and favored extending the standard to affirmative defenses, but a number of
recent decisions adopted the minority approach and declined to apply the
standard. 192
An additional factor muddying the waters for defendants is the impact
of judicial preference in determining whether the standard applies.193 As
most opinions on the issue acknowledge, neither the Supreme Court nor any
Court of Appeals have addressed this issue, leaving judges without
established precedent to follow. 194 Thus, judges exercise their own

188. See infra notes 189–192 and accompanying text.
189. See Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d. 532, 536 (D. Md. 2010)
(noting a “growing majority” of district courts apply Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses);
see also Amy St. Eve & Michael A. Zuckerman, The Forgotten Pleading, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV.
152, 165 (2013) (stating that the “emerging majority view” favors application of the standard to
affirmative defenses).
190. See EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 662 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (noting the
growing minority of district courts to hold that Twombly/Iqbal does not apply to affirmative
defenses); see also Hansen v. Rhode Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287 F.R.D.
119, 122 (D. Mass. 2012) (citing that a “majority of early cases applied the heightened standard,
[but] this is now the minority approach”).
191. See Peter M. Durney & Jonathan P. Michaud, Fending off the Use of a Rule 12(f) Motion
to Strike Affirmative Defenses, DEF. COUNS. J., 438, 444 n.47 (Oct. 2012) (noting that an
“increasing” number of district courts are declining to apply the standard to affirmative defenses);
see also Stephen Mayer, An Implausible Standard for Affirmative Defenses, 112 MICH. L. REV.
275, 275 (2013) (noting that initially a majority of district courts applied the plausibility standard,
“but recently the courts that have declined to extend the plausibility standard have gained majority
status”).
192. See supra note 150.
193. See Miller, supra note 18, at 101 n.391 (noting that “[t]he main factor in determining
whether a particular district court judge applies the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses
appears to be his or her interpretation of Twombly and Iqbal”).
194. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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predilection regarding which standard applies.195 This fluctuation and
judicial predilection does not provide the defendant with a clear expectation
when pleading an affirmative defense.
2. Promoting Fairness: Discovery Is the More Appropriate Venue
to Shape the Bases of Affirmative Defenses
The interest in fairness demonstrates another area where the concerns
espoused in Twombly and Iqbal do not align when applying the
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses. Critics of the
minority approach argue that not extending the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses creates one pleading standard for plaintiffs and a less
stringent pleading standard for defendants. However, this criticism again
ignores the differences between initiatory and responsive pleadings. A
primary purpose of pleading, specifically with complaints, is to provide
“the defendant fair notice of what the claim . . . is and the grounds upon
which it rests.” 196 The pleading system inherently places a higher pleading
burden on the plaintiff because the complaint invokes the jurisdiction of the
court, exposing the defendant to liability and both parties to the time and
expense of litigation. 197 In addition, existing procedures act as fail-safes
and protect the plaintiff during the discovery process.198 Affirmative
defenses are still subject to review during the discovery process and, as with
any defense that is baseless or has no merit, “there will be nothing . . . to
discover or to litigate.” 199
Furthermore, the application of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative
defenses “discounts the fact that defendants usually have considerably less
time to develop affirmative defenses than plaintiffs do claims for relief.” 200
The Federal Judicial Center conducted a study analyzing the effect of
Twombly and Iqbal on pleading practices. 201 The results show that

195. See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 591, 593 (D. Md. 2013)
(discussing how specific judges decided on the issue); see also LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike,
LLC v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D. Md. 2014) (deciding to not apply the standard, in part,
because of the reasoning of Judge Williams in Lockheed Martin).
196. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
197. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the functional difference between
pleading complaints and defenses).
198. The court stated that parties can seek protective orders in response to “onerous discovery
requests.” Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 591, 595 (D. Md. 2013).
Additionally, defendants are still held to the standard of FED. R. CIV. P. 11, under which reciting a
“litany of irrelevant and unsupported affirmative defenses” constitutes sanctionable conduct.
LBCMT 2007-C3 Urbana Pike, LLC v. Sheppard, 302 F.R.D. 385, 387 (D. Md. 2014).
199. Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell, Inc., Civil No. 13-617, 2013 WL 3776933, at *9 (D.
Md. July 17, 2013).
200. Lockheed Martin Corp., 973 F. Supp. 2d at 594.
201. See Lee, III, supra note 5.
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practitioners changed their pleading practices to conduct “[m]ore factual
investigation prior to filing”, include “more factual details in [the]
complaint,” and “[s]creen cases more carefully.” 202 These changed
practices imply more time necessary to complete these tasks before filing
the complaint. In contrast, under Federal Rule 12, the defendant is given
twenty-one days to develop the factual bases for the affirmative defenses,
formulate the response, and submit the answer.203
When answering this critique of the shortened time frame for
defendants to respond, courts that extend the plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses rely on the availability of Rule 15. 204 Under Rule 15, a
defendant may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within twentyone days of serving it. 205 After the twenty-one day window passes, a
defendant must seek consent from the opposing party or leave from the
court to further amend its pleading. 206 These courts argue that under Rule
15, “a defendant may seek leave to amend its answers to assert any viable
defenses that may become apparent during the discovery process.” 207
Moreover, “trial courts liberally grant such leave” provided it does not
result in “unfair prejudice to the opposing party.” 208
However, courts’ focus on Rule 15 ignores the interplay of Rule 26
and the ability of the defendant to access worthwhile discovery materials to
amend its defenses. 209 Under Rule 26(f), the parties are required to meet as
soon as possible to confer about discovery. 210 The parties may not seek
discovery until a Rule 26(f) conference takes place. 211 Yet, the defendant is
still subject to Rule 12, which requires a defendant to answer within twentyone days, and Rule 15(a)(1), which only grants leave to amend as a matter
of course within twenty-one days after serving the answer.212 As such,
within this short timeframe created by Rule 12 and 15(a)(1), the Rule 26(f)
conference may not have occurred, or if it has, little discovery exists for the
202. Id. at 8, 16.
203. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1)(A).
204. See Bradshaw v. Hilco Receivables, LLC, 725 F. Supp. 2d 532, 536–37 (D. Md. 2010)
(stating the availability of Rule 15(a) allows a defendant to amend and add affirmative defenses as
the factual bases becomes apparent during discovery).
205. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1)(A).
206. FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2).
207. Bradshaw, 725 F. Supp. 2d at 536.
208. Id. at 536–37 (citing Zenith Radio Corp., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321
(1971)).
209. See Mayer, supra note 191, at 293–96 (discussing issues created by the application of the
plausibility standard to affirmative defenses, regarding discovery and accordance with the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
210. And at least twenty-one days before the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(f)(1).
211. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A) provides limited exceptions to this
provision.
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 12; FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(1).
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defendant to access and use in amending the answer. 213 Thus for the
defendant to genuinely amend the answer, by incorporating the necessary
factual basis to meet the plausibility standard for affirmative defenses, it is
more likely defendants will be forced to request leave from the court under
Rule 15(a)(2). In comparison to the time that plaintiffs may have to
develop the factual basis for their complaints, without interference from the
Court or in the face of opposition from the future defendant, the time frame
allotted to the defendants is minimal. 214 The reliance on Rule 15 to ensure
fairness for the defendant rings hollow in its practical application.
3.

Incorporation of Plausibility with Affirmative Defenses Will
Result in Cost and Delay Due to a Likely Increase in Motions to
Strike

The application of the plausibility standard to affirmative defenses will
likely lead to an increase in “retaliatory” motions to strike for failure to
plead according to this standard. It is unclear if these “retaliatory” motions
to strike will be successful as courts seem to focus more on demonstrating
prejudice to the plaintiff than to the affirmative defense pleading standard
when assessing a motion to strike. 215 The resulting increase in these
motions illustrates how the efficiency concerns voiced in Twombly and
Iqbal are not achieved by the application of the “heightened” plausibility
standard to affirmative defenses.
a. The Likely Increase in Motions to Strike Will Lead to
Inefficient Expenditure of Resources
With the application of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses,
courts will likely experience a rise in the number of related dispositive
motions, particularly motions to strike. 216 A motion to strike, under Rule
12(f), is a “procedural vehicle” for the plaintiff to attack affirmative
defenses. 217 In the wake of major Supreme Court decisions, which establish

213. It is only after this Rule 26(f) conference that parties must make disclosures within
fourteen days at or after the conference. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(C).
214. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. United States, 973 F. Supp. 2d 591, 594 (D. Md. 2013) (“For
instance, in this case, Plaintiff requests a refund for taxes paid in 2004–2008. Yet Plaintiff did not
file suit until 2013. Once Plaintiff filed suit, Defendant technically had sixty days to respond to
the complaint.”).
215. See infra Part II.A.3.b.
216. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f) provides that: “[t]he court may strike from a pleading an insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The court may act: (1) on
its own; or (2) on motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading or, if a
response is not allowed, within 21 days after being served with the pleading.”
217. See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 189 at 170–71 (discussing the basis for a plaintiff
to utilize a motion to strike an affirmative defense, including “(1) misdesignations (e.g. pleading a
negative defense as an affirmative defense); (2) defective pleading (e.g. failure to comply with
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a new understanding of dispositive motion standards, courts often see an
increase in the filing of these motions thereafter. 218 This increase in
motions practice creates “expensive and time-consuming procedural stop
signs,” inevitably causing more cost and delay. 219
In the context of pleading practices, a major concern after Twombly
and Iqbal was the impact on the use of motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. 220 This concern prompted a study by the Federal Judicial
Center to determine the impact of Twombly and Iqbal on the use of Rule
12(b)(6) motions. 221 The study found that motions to dismiss were more
common after Twombly and Iqbal. 222 Additionally, the study estimated that
the probability of a motion to dismiss being filed in an individual case
increased, from 2.9% in 2006 to 5.8% in 2010. 223 While we await studies
regarding the effect of Twombly and Iqbal on Rule 12(f) motions to strike,
the likely result is the “proliferation of litigation under Rule 12(f).”224
The subsequent rise in motions to dismiss after Twombly and Iqbal
also lead the judiciary to develop techniques to deal with this increased
motions practice. For example, the Honorable Mark A. Goldsmith in the
Unites States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan noted that
many motions to dismiss are “only fencing exercises” which result in the
opposing party being granted leave to amend. 225 The result of this exercise
is that parties spend “precious time and money briefing the issues and the

Rules 8 and 9); and (3) legally insufficient pleading (e.g. pleading an affirmative defense that is
not cognizable under the governing law)”).
218. See Cecil, supra note 5 (finding an increase in motions for summary judgment in the
wake of the Supreme Court trilogy of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), and Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986)).
219. See Miller, supra note 18, at 2, 49–53 (discussing the effects of Twombly and Iqbal in
relation to the Federal Rules and function of the federal courts).
220. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). Specifically, one author noted concern that the plausibility
standard would result in greater use of motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and cause
meritorious claims to fail to reach discovery. Joe S. Cecil, et. al, Motions to Dismiss for Failure to
State a Claim After Iqbal, Report to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
CENTER
1
(Mar.
2011),
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf.
221. See Cecil, supra note 220, at 1.
222. There was a 2.2% increase in filings of 12(b)(6) motions from 2005–2006 to 2009–2010.
Id. at 8.
223. Id. at 10.
224. See St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 189, at 170. Compare Miller, supra note 18, at
103 n.396 (writing in 2010, that “[a]lthough affirmative defenses could be the subject of a Rule(f)
motion to strike, plaintiffs rarely challenge them at the pleading stage. That could change,
however”), with St. Eve & Zuckerman, supra note 189, at 171 (writing, in 2013, that “federal
courts have seen a surge in litigation involving the second category—pleading defects—given the
uncertainty about whether the plausibility test applies to affirmative defenses”).
225. Hon. Mark A. Goldsmith, Trial Practice: A Judicial Response To The Iqbal Revolution,
94 MICH. B.J. 56, 56 (Sept. 2015).
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court will have devoted its own limited resources addressing the motion.”226
Judge Goldsmith adopted his own practice to deal with motions to dismiss
based on Twombly and Iqbal. 227 Even before a response is filed, he issues a
preemptive order “giving the plaintiff leave to amend the challenged
pleading within a specifi[ed] period.” 228 While Judge Goldsmith’s practice
may help to conserve the time and resources of his court, it highlights the
inefficient procedural game-playing that occurs with increased motions
practice.
Similarly, this inefficient procedural game-playing will continue with
the likely increase in motions to strike. Any increase in the burden of
asserting an affirmative defense causes “cost and delay consequences” that
must factor into any realization of efficiency with the plausibility
standard. 229 In Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell, 230 the plaintiff filed two
motions to strike the defendants’ nineteen affirmative defenses. 231 The
court stated that going through the process of striking the defenses and
giving the defendant leave to amend the answer to more completely state
the basis of each defense, “will only delay the inevitable litigation of the
merits.” 232 The application of Twombly and Iqbal to affirmative defenses is
inefficient, both from a case management perspective and for the resources
expended to deal with the “retaliatory” motion to strike.
b. The Prejudice Required to Prevail on a Motion to Strike Is
Not Met by Failure to Plead to the Plausibility Standard
The motion to strike is also generally disfavored, with “a relatively
strict standard” and “liberal” leave to amend, suggesting its purpose as a
“fencing exercise,” rather than as a tool of effective case management. 233 In
the Fourth Circuit, Rule 12(f) 234 motions are viewed with disfavor “because
striking a portion of the pleading is a drastic remedy and because it is often
sought by the movant simply as a dilatory tactic.” 235 To prevail on a motion
to strike an affirmative defense, “plaintiffs must demonstrate that they will
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. See Miller, supra note 18, at 102–03.
230. Civil No. 13-617, 2013 WL 3776933 (D. Md. July 17, 2013).
231. Answer to Complaint at 12–13, Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Simple Cell, Inc., No. 1:13-CV0617 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2013).
232. Simple Cell, 2013 WL 3776933 at *9.
233. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. RJ Wilson Assocs., No. 11-1809, 2012 WL
2945489, at *5 (D. Md. July 17, 2012).
234. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). Federal Rule 12(f) states that a “court may strike from a pleading
any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Id.
235. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting 5A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1380,
647 (2d ed. 1990)).
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be prejudiced if the defense is not stricken.” 236 Although the Court has
“wide” discretion to strike an affirmative defense “in order ‘to minimize
delay, prejudice, and confusion by narrowing the issues for discovery and
trial,’” “when affirmative defenses are stricken, the defendant should
normally be granted leave to amend.” 237
When reviewing a motion to strike, courts seem to place emphasis on a
showing of prejudice by the plaintiff, rather than the appropriate pleading
standard for affirmative defenses. 238 In Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 239 the court concluded Twombly and Iqbal applied to
affirmative defenses and stated that a “defense may be excised if it does not
meet the pleading requirements of Rules 8 and 9.” 240 However, the Haley
court still denied the motion to strike because the plaintiff did not articulate
any prejudice that would occur from the denial of their motion. 241 In
Miller, the court refrained from even considering if Twombly and Iqbal
applied to affirmative defenses and denied the motion to strike because the
plaintiff did not demonstrate prejudice.242
Similarly, in Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. RJ Wilson Associates, 243 the court
stated that “[e]ven if the [Twombly/Iqbal] pleading standards do apply, [the
plaintiff] has not demonstrated prejudice in the event that this court denies
their motion to strike.” 244 Given this focus on whether prejudice will occur
to the plaintiff, there is less emphasis on whether the defendant met the
applicable pleading standard for affirmative defenses. The use of the
pleading standard as the basis of a motion to strike an affirmative defense
seems to be more of “dilatory tactic” than an effective procedural tool. 245
B. District Courts’ Extension of Twombly and Iqbal to Affirmative
Defenses Violates the Rules Enabling Act
The Rules Enabling Act 246 empowers the Supreme Court to prescribe
rules of practice and procedure in the federal courts.247 The Act “delegated
236. Miller v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., Civil No. TDC-14-2697, 2015 WL 235553, at *3
(D. Md. Jan. 15, 2015).
237. Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 279 F.R.D. at 336 (quoting Hayne v.
Green Ford Sales, Inc., 263 F.R.D. 647, 649 (D. Kan. 2009)).
238. See infra notes 241–244 and accompanying text.
239. 279 F.R.D. 331 (D. Md. 2012).
240. Haley Paint Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 279 F.R.D. 331, 336 (D. Md. 2012).
241. Id. at 337.
242. Miller, 2015 WL 235553, at *3.
243. No. CCB-11-1809, 2012 WL 2945489 (D. Md. July 17, 2012).
244. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. RJ Wilson Assocs., Ltd., No. CCB-11-1809,
2012 WL 2945489, at *5 (D. Md. July 17, 2012).
245. Waste Mgmt. Holdings, Inc. v. Gilmore, 252 F.3d 316, 347 (4th Cir. 2001); see supra
note 233 and accompanying text.
246. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77.
247. Id. at § 2072(a).
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the essential rulemaking function” to the Supreme Court.248 Additionally,
the provisions of the Act created a detailed process to make or amend a rule
of practice. 249 The decision by district courts to extend the “heightened”
plausibility standard beyond the arena of complaints as established by the
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 250 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal 251
violates the Act. Additionally, the Supreme Court is a more appropriate
venue for deciding this question and providing a uniform standard for all
federal courts.
The Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal established the heightened
plausibility standard for pleading complaints. 252 The Court interpreted the
language of Rule 8(a)(2) “a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief” to require some factual basis within the
pleading. 253 However, Rule 8(b)(1)(A) only requires a party to “state in
short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it.” 254 By
extending this “heightened” pleading standard to defenses, specifically
under Rule 8(c) for affirmative defenses, district courts have essentially
rewritten the rule to include the “showing” language stated in Rule
8(a)(2). 255 The extension of the heightened plausibility standard to
affirmative defenses interprets Rule 8(c) in a manner not deliberated by the
Supreme Court in either Twombly or Iqbal and thus violates the Rules
Enabling Act. 256
“The pervasive and substantial impact of the rules on the practice of
law in the federal courts demands exacting and meticulous care in drafting
rule changes.” 257 The Rules Enabling Act contains provisions to create
various committees to oversee the rulemaking process and ensure thorough

248. Laws and Procedures Governing the Work of the Rules Committees, supra note 6.
249. Overview
for
the
Bench,
Bar,
and
Public,
USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-processworks/overview-bench-bar-and-public (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
250. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
251. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 90.
253. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). See supra text accompanying note 66.
254. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(1)(A).
255. See Lopez v. Asmar’s Mediterranean Food, Inc., No. 1:10-CV-1218-JCC, 2011 WL
98573, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 10, 2011) (finding the Twombly Court interpreted the language of Rule
8(a)(2) and therefore the Lopez court would not import that language to a “different rule that lacks
that language”); see also Hansen v. Rhode Island’s Only 24 Hour Truck & Auto Plaza, Inc., 287
F.R.D. 119, 122 (D. Mass. 2012) (determining the “drafters used different language in the subsections” of Rule 8 and the court was therefore “hesitant” to extend the Twombly and Iqbal
interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2) to Rule 8(c)).
256. EEOC v. Joe Ryan Enters., 281 F.R.D. 660, 663 (M.D. Ala. 2012) (“The judiciary is
commissioned to interpret the Rules as they are written, not to re-draft them when it may be
convenient.”).
257. Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, supra note 249.
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review of any proposed amendments. 258
The Judicial Conference
“continuously stud[ies] the operation and effect of the general rules of
practice and procedure in the federal courts.” 259 The Advisory Committee,
meanwhile, evaluates proposals for amendments to rules and proposes
drafts of amendments. 260 The decision regarding the scope of Twombly and
Iqbal in the realm of pleadings is better left to these committees to analyze
the effects on pleading in federal courts and propose suggestions to the
Supreme Court. 261 As discussed, supra, two theories regarding the role, and
access to, courts animate the dialogue regarding pleading standards.262 As
Arthur Miller, a prior member of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of
the Judicial Conference of the United States, noted: “[u]ltimately, the
Advisory Committee will have to reconcile the continuing viability of the
values of 1938 with the realities of 2010, and find a way to uphold the
principle of access and the other policy objectives underlying the original
Rules while adjusting to contemporary litigation conditions.” 263 Due to the
significance of this decision, endorsing a particular theory regarding the
role of courts and influencing subsequent judicial policies, the Supreme
Court should provide resolution to the question of whether the plausibility
standard extends to affirmative defenses or not.
III. CONCLUSION
The question of whether the “heightened” plausibility standard applies
to affirmative defenses currently divides the lower federal courts. The
inconsistent application of the standard to affirmative defenses results in a
state of uncertainty regarding the pleading standard, and exemplifies an
unforeseen consequence stemming from the adoption of this standard by the
Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 264 and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal. 265
In the absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts
should refrain from extending this standard to affirmative defenses in order
to maintain a reliable standard, while also upholding fairness and efficiency
258. Laws and Procedures Governing the Work of the Rules Committees, supra note 6.
259. Governance
and
the
Judicial
Conference,
USCOURTS.GOV,
http://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/governance-judicial-conference (last visited Jan. 8,
2016).
260. How the Rulemaking Process Works, USCOURTS.GOV, http://www.uscourts.gov/rulespolicies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works (last visited Jan. 8, 2016).
261. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 595 (1998) (“[O]ur cases demonstrate that
questions regarding pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are most frequently and most
effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process.”).
262. See supra text accompanying notes 27–33.
263. See Miller, supra note 18, at 104.
264. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
265. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
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in the litigation process. Leaving this question to the discretion of each
individual district court results in a fluctuating standard, which constitutes a
significant drawback for defendants when pleading affirmative defenses. 266
The ensuing back and forth to determine the appropriate standard and deal
with any “retaliatory” motions to strike only serves to increase cost and
time delays for defendants and courts. 267 The extension of the
“heightened” plausibility standard to affirmative defenses also discounts the
time constraints facing defendants and places a substantial burden to
articulate the factual basis for any affirmative defense without adequate
discovery. 268 The continuing application of the standard by the district
court violates the Rules Enabling Act, permitting courts to essentially
rewrite the pleading standard for affirmative defenses to include a plausible
factual basis. 269 Resolution to this question is best left to the Supreme
Court, to speak with one voice and provide a uniform standard for
affirmative defense pleadings among all of the federal courts.

266.
267.
268.
269.

See supra Part II.A.1.
See supra Part II.A.3.
See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.B.

